Citation Codes: 2022 4 SCC 463, (2022) 1 SCC (Civ) 672, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 131
Date of Judgment: 1st February 2022
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: Justice Indira Banerjee & Justice Abhay S. Oka
Facts of the case
The case involved a dispute between Indian Oil Corporation (Indian Oil) and Shree Ganesh Petroleum (Shree Ganesh) regarding a lease agreement for a retail petrol pump.
The lease agreement was signed on September 25, 2005, and it stipulated a fixed monthly rent of INR 1,750. The lease was for a period of 29 years and 11 months, with the possibility of renewal by mutual consent. Disputes arising from the lease agreement were to be referred to the Managing Director of Indian Oil or his nominee, and if the Managing Director was unable to act, then to another person nominated by the Managing Director. Importantly, the lease agreement explicitly stated that “no person other than the Managing Director or his nominee could act as an arbitrator, and if that was not possible, the matter would not be referred to arbitration at all”.
In addition to the lease agreement, there was a separate dealership agreement between Indian Oil and Shree Ganesh, dated November 15, 2006. The dealership agreement was in force for 15 years and could be extended for successive periods of one year each, subject to Termination by either party with three months’ notice. Disputes under the dealership agreement were to be referred to the Director (Marketing) of Indian Oil, who could act as an arbitrator or nominate another officer of Indian Oil to act as an arbitrator.
In 2008, disputes arose between the parties when Indian Oil noticed irregularities in the functioning of the petrol outlet. After issuing a show cause notice to Shree Ganesh, Indian Oil terminated the dealership agreement and demanded that Shree Ganesh vacate the premises. In response, Shree Ganesh invoked arbitration in 2009 under the dealership agreement. In its statement of claim, Shree Ganesh requested an amendment of the lease agreement to increase the monthly rent to INR 35,000, with a 20% increase every three years.
The sole arbitrator, appointed by the Director (Marketing) of Indian Oil, issued an award in November 2010. The arbitrator found that due to the Termination of the dealership agreement, Shree Ganesh would have no income from the dealership and increased the rent to INR 10,000, with a 10% increase every three years. The arbitrator also ruled that the lease period should be kept as per the dealership period mentioned in a newspaper advertisement.
Indian Oil challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The District Court ruled in favor of Indian Oil on the issue of lease period but upheld the arbitrator’s decision to increase the rent. On appeal, the Bombay High Court upheld the arbitrator’s decision on both issues. Indian Oil then filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue
Whether the arbitral award, which enhanced the rent payable under a lease agreement and modified the lease period, was liable to be set aside under Section 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, on the grounds that it exceeded the scope of submission to arbitration.
Rule
An arbitral tribunal is a creature of contract and is bound to act in accordance with the terms of the contract. An award is patently illegal when the tribunal fails to act in terms of the contract or ignores the specific terms of the contract. However, there is a distinction between an error in interpreting a contract, which falls within the tribunal’s jurisdiction, and a failure to act in accordance with the contract, which renders the award patently illegal.
Application
In this case, the lease agreement and the dealership agreement were separate and independent contracts with different terms and dispute resolution mechanisms. The lease agreement provided for disputes to be referred to the Managing Director or his nominee, while the dealership agreement provided for disputes to be referred to the Director (Marketing) of Indian Oil. The lease agreement explicitly stated that if disputes could not be referred to the Managing Director, the matter could not be referred to arbitration at all.
The arbitrator, appointed by the Director (Marketing) under the dealership agreement, exceeded his authority by enhancing the rent and modifying the lease period. These modifications were beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration and were patently illegal. Furthermore, the composition of the arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with the lease agreement, as the Director (Marketing) issued a ruling on the lease agreement instead of the designated arbitrator.
The Supreme Court’s Analysis
The Court first acknowledged that the lease agreement and the dealership agreement were separate and independent contracts with different terms and dispute resolution mechanisms. The lease agreement specified that disputes should be referred to the Managing Director or his nominee, while the dealership agreement stated that disputes should be referred to the Director (Marketing) of Indian Oil. The Court noted that under the lease agreement, if disputes could not be referred to the Managing Director for any reason, the matter could not be referred to arbitration at all.
The Court emphasized that an arbitral tribunal is a creature of contract and is bound to act in accordance with the terms of the contract. It stated that an award is patently illegal when the tribunal fails to act in terms of the contract or ignores the specific terms of the contract. However, the Court made a distinction between an error in interpreting a contract, which falls within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, and a failure to act in accordance with the contract, which renders the award patently illegal.
In this case, the Court found that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority by enhancing the rent and modifying the lease period. These modifications were beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration and were considered patently illegal. The Court also noted that the composition of the arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with the lease agreement, as the Director (Marketing) had issued a ruling on the lease agreement instead of the designated arbitrator.
Based on these findings, the Court held that the arbitral award was liable to be set aside under Section 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Arbitration Act. It concluded that the decision to enhance the lease rent was patently beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, and the composition of the arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with the lease agreement. The court relied on the case of Army Welfare where, the court held that the tribunal is not a court of law, hence cannot exercise power ex debito justitiae, meaning “by reason of an obligation of justice”.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court held that the arbitral award was liable to be set aside under Section 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, as it exceeded the scope of submission to arbitration and was patently illegal. The Court emphasized that an arbitral tribunal is bound by the terms of the contract and cannot modify them unless explicitly authorized to do so. The Court’s decision clarifies the distinction between an erroneous interpretation of a contract, which falls within the tribunal’s jurisdiction, and a failure to act in accordance with the contract, which renders the award patently illegal.
Author(s)
Raj Pipara
Student at UPES, Dehradun