Introduction
India’s tryst with the Group of Companies doctrine has sure been a contentious issue ever since it was first applied in 2013 in the case of Chloro Controls Pvt Ltd vs Severn Trent Water Purification Inc where it was held that when it is evident from the facts surrounding the transaction that both the signatory and the non-signatory had the mutual understanding that the arbitration agreement would bind them, the non-signatory who is a member of the same corporate group as the signatory may be made a party to the arbitration.
At that time, the judgment sure was considered a significant change from the general ruling of courts who were fixed in the principle of privity of contracts and hence only allowed those parties to arbitration who were signatory to the arbitration agreement. Any non-signatory would not be considered a party.
However, the Choro Controls judgment was sure welcome in the Indian arbitration practice and jurisprudence however, the Supreme Court has sure been having difficulties applying this doctrine in its right sense. Various issues are yet to be answered and go unaddressed. After over a decade from the introduction of this doctrine. A Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court has finally laid down a comprehensive judgment with respect to the applicability of this doctrine and has answered varied issues with respect to it.
Following issues were brought before the Supreme Court.
- If the group of companies’ doctrine can exist in Indian jurisprudence without being referenced to any statute, or if it should be incorporated into Section 8 of the Arbitration Act?
- Should the “single economic reality” theory be the foundation for the group of companies’ doctrine going forward?
- Is it appropriate to interpret the implied consent or intent to arbitrate between the parties using the group of companies doctrine?
- Can the group of companies doctrine be implemented even in the absence of implied consent based solely on the concepts of alter ego and/or piercing the corporate veil?
Judgment
After hearing, both the sides, the Supreme Court on 6th December 2023 laid down its judgment. It addressed the issues which the 3-judge bench had referred and clarified its stance. The judgment has been divided into various points.
Entities within a corporate group have distinct legal personalities that cannot be disregarded.
Except in extreme cases like fraud, entities within a corporate group have distinct legal personalities that cannot be disregarded. The fundamental difference between a parent company and its subsidiary cannot simply be erased by using financial expediency. Legally, unless there is a compelling reason to do so, a parent company’s obligations and rights cannot be transferred to a subsidiary company and vice versa.
Determining Shared Intention between parties and Commonality of Subject Matter
The Supreme Court laid down that the core tenet of the application of the “group of companies” doctrine is maintaining the corporate separateness of the group of companies while determining the parties’ shared intention to bind non-signatories to the arbitration agreement. Whether or not the non-signatory parties intend to be legally bound by the arbitration agreement is evident from their actions. The court further established that the parties’ intention to be bound by the arbitration agreement can be ascertained from the facts surrounding the non-signatory party’s participation in the underlying contract’s negotiation, performance, and Termination.
It is possible for a non-signatory to participate significantly in the negotiation or execution of the contractual obligations without formally agreeing to be bound by the associated obligations, such as arbitration, in complex transactions involving multiple parties and contracts.
Commonality of the subject matter means that the non-signatory party’s actions have to be connected to the arbitration agreement’s subject matter. For example, if the distribution of healthcare goods is the subject matter of the contract that underpins the arbitration agreement, the non-signatory party’s conduct should also be related to or in compliance with the contractual duties and obligations, i.e., pertaining to the distribution of healthcare goods. Determining this component is crucial to proving that the non-signatory party agreed to arbitrate on the specific topic at hand.
Section 2(1)(h) and Section 7 of the Arbitration Act, when read harmoniously, give rise to the concept of “group of companies,” which exists independently as a legal principle.
The signatory and non-signatory parties are included in the definition of “parties” under Section 2(1)(h) read with Section 7 of the Arbitration Act. The non-signatory parties’ actions may indicate that they agree to be bound by the arbitration agreement. Non-signatory parties may still be bound by the arbitration agreement despite Section 7’s requirement for a written agreement.
Tight Group Structure and Single Economic Unit not the Basis
The Supreme Court in the present matter finally laid down that a single economic unit can’t be the basis for applying the group of companies’ doctrine as laid down in the Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd vs Canara Bank. Implied consent is the basis for applying the doctrine rather than single economic unit. Applying the single economic unit principle instead is actually contrary to company law which lays down the principle that each company is a separate legal entity. There is no convergence between the principle of separate legal entity and single economic unit. The arbitration agreement cannot be binding on non-signatory parties only because of the existence of commercial relationships between a party and the non-signatory. Using this method would bind the arbitration agreement to all non-signatories within a corporate group, even if they have nothing to do with the contractual obligations being considered.
Applying the group of companies doctrine cannot be predicated on the idea of “alter ego” or “piercing the corporate veil.”
The application of the Group of Companies doctrine is predicated on determining the parties’ shared intention rather than on lifting the corporate veil. Because equity and good faith are the primary considerations, the principle of alter ego ignores the corporate separateness and the parties’ intentions. The group of companies’ doctrine, on the other hand, makes it easier to ascertain the parties’ intentions in order to identify the actual parties to the arbitration agreement without interfering with the entity’s legal personality.
Parties are not the same as parties “claiming through or under” a party to an arbitration agreement under the Arbitration Act.
The Supreme Court laid down that the decision in Chloro Controls judgment, that states that the term “parties claiming through or under” can bind “non-signatories” is erroneous since it binds the parties’ successors-in-interest in a derivative capacity. This is because, first of all, this interpretation fails to take into account the need for subsidiary businesses within a corporate group to retain their own legal identities, which allows the parent company to bear all of the associated companies’ obligations, liabilities, and risks. Second, there’s a chance that this interpretation will cause misunderstandings and misuse. Strategic maneuvers to drag unrelated parties into arbitration proceedings become possible if non-signatory entities can be bound to arbitration agreements through loose associations or claims of “claiming through or under.”
Whether non-signatory party can apply for interim measures under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act.
The group of companies’ doctrine is based on determining the mutual intention to join the non-signatory as a “veritable” party to the arbitration agreement. Once a tribunal comes to the determination that a non-signatory is a party to the arbitration agreement, such non-signatory party can apply for interim measures under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act.
Reference under both Sections 8 and 11
The Supreme Court decided, that both Sections 8 and 11 have a narrow scope of reference. the court’s task at the referral stage is limited to establishing the arbitration agreement’s existence. The arbitration tribunal should make the final decision if the referral court is unable to do so. The arbitral tribunal should be permitted to carry out its primary jurisdiction, and the referral court should refrain from needless intervention in the arbitration process.
Conclusion
Gary Born suggests that the group of companies’ doctrine is helpful because it allows the courts to go beyond the objective intentions of the parties to determine their dynamic subjective intentions both before, during, and after the execution of the contract. According to Born, the doctrine also promotes efficacy of arbitration agreements by prohibiting circumvention of arbitration through satellite litigation by non-signatory parties within a group.
A proper and comprehensive guideline about the doctrine was a long overdue step and the author welcomes it. It is a significant upgrade of the Indian arbitration law and finally assists claimants from getting their dispute addressed properly by involving not just the signatory to the arbitration agreement but even non signatories as well, mainly parent companies who often try to shed of their liability on the ground that they are not signatories. The author is in complete approval of the answers given by the Supreme Court with respect to all issues it addressed. The judgment adapts arbitration practices to contemporary business structures, fostering a more comprehensive and inclusive approach that aligns with the complex dynamics of corporate India. The judgment is a detailed review of jurisprudential evolution of the group of companies doctrine.
However, on the other hand, it is important that the courts carefully apply this doctrine by applying the guidelines laid down through this judgment. It is important that a party is not impleaded in the matter wrongfully and careful analysis needs to be done with concerning his role in the agreement. Privity of contract is the general rule, however, the group of companies doctrine gives out an exception to this concerning arbitration agreements and clauses.
Author(s)

Yash Dahiya
Associate at AK Law offices
