Beyond the “Fruits of the Award”: Reinterpreting Section 9 in Post-Award Arbitration

 Introduction

It is often believed that arbitration is a process that concludes upon the making of the award. In practice, however, the period between the making of the award and its enforcement determines whether the dispute was truly resolved. The Supreme Court in the recent judgment of Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haresh N. Sanghavi[i] dealt with a similar issue.

The principal question before the Hon’ble Court was whether a losing party in an arbitration proceedings can seek interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996[ii] (hereinafter “The Act”), after the award has been made, but it is yet to be enforced.[iii] These were not mere procedural questions before the Court, as they go to the very heart of how Indian arbitration law conceives the role of interim measures.

Divergent Judicial Views

Prior to this decision, the Courts were divided in interpreting Section 9 of the Act. The Catena of cases led by Dirk India Pvt. Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Electricity Generation Co. Ltd.,[iv] took a restrictive view. It held that, post-award, the interim reliefs existed only to preserve the fruits of the award, and therefore only a successful party could invoke Section 9. The Delhi High Court followed a similar logic in Nussli Switzerland Ltd. v. Organising Committee, Commonwealth Games 2010[v] and later in National Highways Authority of India v. Punjab National Bank[vi]. Analogous views were reflected in the decisions of other High Courts.

Conversely, a different interpretation took place, wherein Section 9 was construed in wider terms. In decisions such as Saptarishi Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. National Institute of Tourism & Hospitality Management,[vii] GAIL (India) Ltd. v. Latin Rasayani Pvt. Ltd.,[viii] and DLF Home Developers Ltd. v. Orris Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.,[ix] courts emphasized that Section 9 speaks of the term “a party” without qualification. The Court stated that in the absence of any limitation in the provision to the award holder, the courts should not create such restrictions. This created a practical uncertainty, particularly in cases where the assets forming the subject matter of the dispute are at the risk of being dissipated while a Section 34[x] challenge is pending.

Resolving the Conflict: The Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 9

The Supreme Court adopted the plain reading of Section 9 in resolving this conflict. The provision allows “a party” to seek interim measures before, during, or after the arbitral proceedings but before enforcement. On a fair reading of the text, the provision is not limited to the party[xi] that is successful in obtaining the relief. The Court therefore recognized that the expression covers “any party” to the arbitration agreement, as defined under Section 2(1)(h) of the Act.[xii]

The judgment also compares Article 9 of the UNCITRAL Model Law[xiii] and the provision under the Act. Article 9 permits the interim measures before or during arbitral proceedings, whereas Section 9 expressly extends the measure into the post-award stage until enforcement. The Court recognized this difference as a conscious legislative intent. The court held that the legislation gave Indian courts a wider post-award power under Section 9 than what the Model Law contemplates. Because of this conscious choice of the legislation, it will be wrong on the part of the Courts to read the statute in a restrictive sense. The courts should not rewrite the provision by narrowing it down to one class of parties, when the provision of the Act is clear and unambiguous.

Why the “Fruits of the award” theory was rejected

The Supreme Court’s most significant interpretive move lay in its rejection of the traditional “fruits of the award” theory, under which Section 9 was treated primarily as a tool for securing the award-holder’s eventual recovery. This theory was dismissed, and the Apex court stated that it is not confined to preserving the benefit conferred by the award. It can also be invoked to preserve the subject matter of the dispute so that the eventual outcome of the proceedings, including any challenges under Section 34 of the Act, remains capable of providing meaningful relief.

This is crucial in cases where the subject matter is transferred, encumbered, wasted or otherwise put beyond the reach during the challenge period, the success of a party under Section 34 may become hollow. Therefore, a narrow “fruits of the award” approach leaves the losing party without any efficacious remedy or justice. The wider interpretation by the Court treats the protection under Section 9 as instrumental to the integrity of the arbitration itself and not just a post- award enforcement tool.

The distinct roles of Section 9 and 36

The Court additionally addressed the argument that Section 34 and Section 36[xiv] of the Act already provide adequate protection for the unsuccessful party and therefore the protection under Section 9 is unnecessary. The Court rejected the argument and drew a clear distinction between the two provisions. On one hand, Section 36 deals with the enforceability of the award and also provides for the stay of execution under sub-section (3), whereas on the other hand, Section 9 empowers the court to grant substantive interim measures to preserve the subject matter of the dispute.

Further, it was also recognised that a stay of an enforcement order only relates to the execution of the award obtained in the proceedings; it does not prevent the parties from taking any steps that may make the award ineffective upon enforcement. The successful party, even after a stay of execution, can take steps to diminish the value of the subject matter or to complicate restoration later. Therefore, the Court reasoned that Section 9 is necessary to fill the lacunae between the procedural protection and practical preservation.

What the decision changes

The Court’s decision has reduced the possibility that a party could succeed in the courts, but might not derive any benefit[xv] in practical terms at the enforcement stage.

The Supreme Court has also clarified that previously; it was presumed that Section 9 was created to allow an award-holder to recover their award. However, now we see this Section as a way of preserving the subject matter of the dispute from the time the award is made until such time as the award is challenged under Section 34 of the Act. This interpretation is likely to increase the number of applications being filed to preserve disputed property from being wasted or disposed of during post-award proceedings.  

At the same time, Courts must distinguish between preservation claims and applications made solely to extend the post-award proceedings or order to prevent enforcement of an award. Access to an extended relief under Section 9 cannot be interpreted as a license for unsuccessful parties who are to obtain a regular injunction after an award. An applicant requires to establish a legitimate concern about the subject matter of the proceedings or to the effectiveness of any eventual relief that may arise from a successful Section 34 challenge. This decision signifies a shift away from an exclusive focus on the award itself and toward protecting the overall practical efficacy of the arbitration process.

The Deeper Doctrinal Shift

The Supreme Court’s decision is a landmark ruling because it recognizes the rights of the unsuccessful party under Section 9 and also marks a deeper doctrinal shift with respect to the post-award stage in the Indian arbitration law. Arbitration can no longer be treated as a process which will freeze upon the delivery of the award, as the rights of parties are fluid and change even after the award is passed, until it survives the challenge and is effectively enforced. The judgment by the Hon’ble Court also fits within the broader judicial approach of courts of reading the arbitration law in a manner to preserve the utility of the process rather than reducing it to formal closure.

Conclusion

The Home Care Retail Marts decision marks a watershed moment in Indian arbitration law as it establishes that parties who lose an arbitration proceeding may seek interim relief after the award is rendered. A plain reading of Section 9, as construed by the Court, is a reflection of the intention of the drafters who envisaged interim protection to continue beyond the award stage.  The restricted “fruits of the award” theory was dismissed as it denied losing parties essential protection. The award is important, but the time period in which the award is challenged and prepared for enforcement also matters to deliver meaningful justice. The process of interim relief in arbitration needs a broad understanding because it serves as an essential part of the system which delivers just outcomes. The core contribution of the judgment was in its recognition that the arbitration process does not end with the award being rendered; the effectiveness of the arbitration process is also anchored upon being able to preserve some degree of relief after the award has been made.

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[i] Home Care Retail Marts Pvt Ltd v Haresh N Sanghavi 2026 INSC 415.

[ii] Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, s 9.

[iii] Angad Varma, Nikhil Mehndiratta and Nidhisha Choksi, ‘Section 9: A right, not a reward — The scope of “a party” at the post-award stage’ (Bar and Bench, 11 May 2026). (barandbench.com)

[iv] Dirk India Pvt Ltd v Maharashtra State Electricity Generation Co Ltd 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 481.

[v] Nussli Switzerland Ltd v Organising Committee, Commonwealth Games 2010 Delhi 2014 SCC OnLine Del 4838.

[vi] National Highways Authority of India v Punjab National Bank 2021 SCC OnLine Del 2639.

[vii] Saptarishi Hotels Pvt Ltd v National Institute of Tourism & Hospitality Management 2024 SCC OnLine TS 1870.

[viii] GAIL (India) Ltd v Latin Rasayani Pvt Ltd 2023 SCC OnLine Del 7895.

[ix] DLF Home Developers Ltd v Orris Infrastructure Pvt Ltd 2024 SCC OnLine Del 3307.

[x] Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, s 34.

[xi] Aparna Ravichandran, ‘SC: Unsuccessful party can invoke Section 9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act’ (SCC Online Blog, 27 April 2026).

[xii] Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, s 2(1)(h).

[xiii] UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985, art 9.

[xiv] Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, s 36.

[xv] Ritu, ‘Unsuccessful Party Can Invoke S 9 Arbitration Act Post-Award: Supreme Court Settles Conflicting HC Views’ (LiveLaw, 26 April 2026). (livelaw.in)

Author(s)