Introduction
The Singapore International Arbitration Centre (2025) Arbitration Rules (“SIAC Rules 2025”) marks a significant procedural development with the codification of the two distinct mechanism for securing monetary protection in the arbitral proceedings, namely, security for costs and security for claims, which tribunals may order on application by the parties. For the first time, these powers have been expressly codified under Rule 48 and 49 of SIAC rules 2025. Under Rule 48, a tribunal can require a claimant, or counterclaimant, to furnish security for legal fees and arbitration costs; under Rule 49, a tribunal can require a respondent to secure the claim itself. These Rules are intended as “procedural mechanism[s] designed to ensure that a party responding to a claim provides financial security to safeguard the enforcement of any potential award”. In practice, these mechanisms protect parties on both sides: a security-for-costs order guards against an impecunious claimant failing to reimburse respondent’s costs, while a security-for-claims order protects a claimant in case a respondent refuses payment of an award.
This article analyses how Singapore seated arbitral tribunals and courts have applied Rules 48–49 in recent cases, and then examines how similar measures fit within India’s Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”), focusing on Sections 17 and 9 alongwith the precedents that have shaped their interpretation.
SIAC Rules 2025: Security for Costs (R.48) vs Security for Claims (R.49)
SIAC Rule 48.1 allows “a party [to] apply to the Tribunal for an order that any party asserting a claim … provide security for legal costs and expenses and the costs of the arbitration.”. In contrast, Rule 49.1 empowers “a party [to] apply to the Tribunal for an order that any party responding to a claim… provide security against the relevant claim”. In short, a claimant may be ordered to deposit costs under Rule 48, while a respondent may be ordered to deposit a portion of the claim under Rule 49. The Rules do not prescribe rigid tests, but tribunals must exercise discretion by applying “the circumstances of the case” with due notice to parties. In practice, SIAC tribunals will look at factors like (i) the strength of the other side’s case, (ii) the requesting party’s risk of non-payment, and (iii) the financial position of the party to pay. As one commentator notes, the new Rules explicitly empower tribunals to order either form of security, reflecting SIAC’s intent to align with similar powers in other major rules, e.g. Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (“HKIAC”) Rule 44. No single formula applies, but tribunals often heed analogous common-law principles.
Key differences between R.48 and R.49 include the identity of the protected party and the triggering circumstances. Under Rule 48 the respondent to the claim is the beneficiary, and the claimant bears the burden of producing security. Under Rule 49 the claimant is protected, and the respondent must furnish the security. Importantly, the burden of proof is on the applicant to satisfy the tribunal that conditions justify an order. For security-for-costs, a respondent must demonstrate that the claimant is likely unable to pay costs if unsuccessful; for security-for-claims, the claimant must show a risk that a respondent could frustrate payment of the award. In both cases the tribunal will require evidence of financial insecurity or of fraudulent intent. If an order is made and not complied with, the Rules allow the tribunal to adjust procedures or even draw adverse inferences. In sum, SIAC rules 2025 entrusts tribunals with broad power to impose deposit orders whenever justice so requires, subject to appropriate procedural safeguards.
Singapore Courts’ Approach: DJK v DJN and OCBC v Ang Thian Soo
Singapore courts have upheld the breadth of SIAC’s security provisions through DJK v DJN[i] that relies uponOCBC v Ang Thian Soo[ii]. In DJK, the High Court of Singapore considered an arbitrator’s orders, under SIAC Rules 2016, Rule 27(j) & (k), requiring a claimant (respondent in arbitration) to furnish both security for costs and security for the claim. The claimant challenged these “Security Orders” as outside the tribunal’s powers. The Court reaffirmed that SIAC’s old Rule 27(j) and (k) (now Rules 48–49) grant “wide” discretion [¶77]: Rule 27(j) permits ordering “any party to provide security for legal or other costs in any manner the Tribunal thinks fit,” and Rule 27(k) allows ordering a party to secure “all or part of any amount in dispute”. These provisions are plenary, and SIAC tribunals may apply them flexibly. Contrary to the claimants’ submission, the court held there is no fixed or different “test” for costs vs claims; indeed, factors overlap as both were asked whether the case is strong. The defendant-applicant in DJK stressed that neither SIAC Rules nor caselaw prescribe rigid standards for distinguishing the two orders, and the tribunal was entitled to take into account any circumstances it deems appropriate; the SGHC agreed.
In DJK, the arbitrator considered a range of evidence, including the defendant’s submitted costs, the claimant’s financial distress, and the low likelihood of a defence succeeding. Notably, the court approved the arbitrator’s reference to OCBC. In OCBC, the Singapore High Court had held that when a defendant’s case is “very small,” requiring security is appropriate. OCBC was a precursor where Choo J balanced equities: the defendant was ordered to post SG$9 million, part of the guaranteed claim, and SG$500,000 for costs. The rationale was to protect the plaintiff and ensure an award could be satisfied. DJK’s arbitrator similarly reasoned that if a defence seems likely to fail, security should be ordered. The SGHC in DJK found no bias or excess of jurisdiction in the arbitrator’s approach. It held the tribunal legitimately considered the first claimant’s financial precariousness in ordering security and did not err in treating security-for-costs and security-for-claim factors as “inter-linked”. Importantly, the tribunal imposed only partial security for the claim, i.e., USD250,000 of USD1,025,890 claimed, and rationalized the figure, in light of emails and interim figures, which the court allowed. The SGHC stressed that tribunals need not require full security if that would destroy the claim; an order may be calibrated as “just and convenient” based on all circumstances.
In sum, Singapore courts give tribunals wide berth under SIAC Rules. An arbitrator may order a deposit if it finds fair cause, typically, (a) no serious arguable defence, (b) real risk of asset dissipation or non-payment, and (c) evidence of inability to pay costs. The tribunal’s discretion is “wide” and may balance interests of both sides. DJK shows that as long as a tribunal hears argument, even on supplemental submissions, and gives reasons, the courts will uphold security orders on normal judicial review grounds, i.e., legality and fairness. These principles, though under SIAC law, form persuasive guidance on how security orders operate procedurally.
Indian Law: Section 17 and Section 9 Authorities
Tribunal powers (Section 17)
Under Indian law, Section 17(1)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”), empowers a tribunal to order “with respect to the subject-matter of the dispute” various interim measures, including an order that “with respect to the claim or any part of the claim, require the party to provide security in connection with that claim or part of the claim”. In effect, this gives tribunals discretionary power to require deposits for securing claims, akin to SIAC Rule 49. After the 2015 amendments, Section 17 has been clarified: an order under Section 17 is deemed to be a court order for all purposes and is enforceable under the Code of Civil Procedure, in the same manner as an order of the court. Indeed, the global guide notes that post-amendment, an Indian tribunal “has the same power for making orders under section 17 of the Act as the court has under section 9,” and any such order is enforceable as a civil court decree. In short, Indian tribunals have broad authority analogous to SIAC’s: they may require a party to furnish security for the arbitral proceedings or for any claim, and those orders carry the weight of court orders.
Indian High Courts have largely treated Section 17 orders like pre-judgment attachments. For example, Delhi HC in Natrip Implementation Society v. IVRCL Ltd[iii]. observed that Section 17(1)(b)(ii) is akin to Order XXXVIII R.5 CPC and thus refused an interim deposit where no risk was shown [¶20-21]. Similarly, the Madras and Bombay High Courts have imposed CPC-like tests for Section 17 relief. The result is that Indian tribunals, though vested with wide statutory authority, often apply a three-pronged test: prima facie success, balance of convenience, including risk of award frustration, and interest of justice. This approach may differ from SIAC’s more liberal one. In practice, however, if an Indian tribunal finds an impending award is in jeopardy e.g. the defendant is planning to disperse assets, it can order a security deposit under Section 17(1)(b)(v).
Court powers (Section 9)
Courts under Section 9(1) can grant interim measures at any stage, including orders to preserve evidence or assets, appoint receivers, and “secure the amount in dispute by requiring a party to furnish appropriate security”. Section 9(1)(ii)(b) specifically allows a court to direct a party to pay money into court or furnish a guarantee to secure the dispute. Although Indian law does not explicitly mirror SIAC’s “security for costs” terminology, courts have treated Section 9 as encompassing security for costs. The Delhi High Court has held that “security for costs is a provisional measure that can be ordered by the competent court or tribunal” under Sections 9 and 17. In fact, Section 9(3), as amended, now requires courts to decline interim applications if an effective remedy under Section 17 exists, reflecting the parity between court and tribunal powers.
Judicial interpretation
The Supreme Court of India has emphasized that the Arbitration Act’s interim measures should not be hampered by technical CPC rules. In Essar House v. ArcelorMittal, the Court held that when considering a petition under Section 9, the court need only see (i) a prima facie case, (ii) balance of convenience, and (iii) urgency; it ought not to withhold the relief on mere technicalities such as missing averments under Order 38 R.5 CPC [¶ 49-50]. In other words, Section 9 was “not strictly bound by” the CPC’s specific criteria.
Apart from Essar House, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on Section 9 has been mixed. In Sanghi Industries v. Ravin Cables, the SC reiterated that orders under Section 9 require satisfaction of Order 38 R.5 CPC preconditions, prima facie case and risk of asset dissipation [¶ 4-4.1]. But Essar House had already held that the Court has discretion to ignore CPC technicalities, provided the three broad conditions are met. High Courts and, after Essar, even the SC in part, have said Section 9 is broader than CPC; yet Sanghi temporarily re-asserted the CPC analogy. For present purposes, the critical point is: Indian courts can and do order security deposits under Section 9 when warranted, but they typically insist on showing more than mere default; there must be evidence the defendant might try to defeat any future award. Similarly, Indian tribunals’ powers under Section 17 are meant to be co-extensive with courts’.
However, more recent authority has placed substance-over-form limits on Section 17. In Evergreen Land Mark Pvt. Ltd. v. John Tinson & Co., a Supreme Court bench unanimously held that a tribunal must be cautious when liability is “seriously disputed.” In Evergreen, landlords sought under Section 17 to have the lessee deposit rent during lockdown periods. The SC held that if there is a genuine dispute on liability, especially if the tribunal has yet to consider key defences (e.g. force majeure), the tribunal cannot simply impose a full deposit. Quoting Order XXXVIII R.5 CPC principles, the Court explained that the amount-in-dispute provision, i.e., Section 17(1)(b)(ii) is akin to attachment before judgment, requiring a triable case and risk of asset dissipation. The result was that the tribunal’s blanket deposit order was modified: the deposit was limited to months where the tenant had no defence, i.e. partial closure, but rent for complete lockdown was not demanded upfront [¶7] . Evergreen thus underscores that Indian tribunals must still respect fairness: a tribunal may order a security deposit only if (a) there is a prima facie case and (b) a real threat of award frustration. This effectively imports CPC-style tests into the exercise of Section 17 powers. In sum, whereas SIAC tribunals have unfettered discretion, Indian tribunals face the additional check that no genuine dispute should be ignored when requiring security.
Enforceability of orders
Both Sections 9 and 17 allow orders that are enforceable as civil court decrees. Section 17(3) explicitly made interim orders of an arbitrator “enforceable under the Code of Civil Procedure, in the same manner as an order of the court”. Thus, a security-for-claims order from an Indian tribunal can be executed through attachment proceedings or deposit enforcement. If a party disobeys a Section 17 order, the tribunal may then make a ruling adverse to that party, such as striking out claims or defenses, and enforce that by treaty. Moreover, the Act does not permit a second bite: if an arbitrator is in place and can act, Section 9(3) bars the courts from entertaining the same relief. Finally, Section 38(2) of the Act forbids courts from staying enforcement of an arbitral interim order. Thus, under Indian law, both tribunal and court orders for security are backed by enforceable power.
SIAC-style Provisions in Indian Arbitrations and Enforcement Concerns
Parties in India are free to adopt SIAC rules by choice of institutional arbitration. If an India-seated arbitration specifies SIAC 2025 Rules by agreement, the tribunal will follow Rules 48–49. Such a tribunal’s order for security would be made under Section 17 of the Act, rendering it directly enforceable in India. Even without SIAC rules, parties could, by agreement, incorporate a similar security-for-claim clause in their arbitration agreement. The Act’s non-derogable powers permit an agreement for any interim remedy, but they do not explicitly mention security for costs. The closest analogues in the Act are the broad powers to preserve assets and “direct any person to provide such security”. In any case, if SIAC orders are made by an India-seated tribunal, Indian courts would treat them as proper Section 17 orders, enforceable under the CPC.
Enforcement in India is most straightforward when the tribunal sits in India; After 2015, any such interim order is a court order in all but name. If a SIAC tribunal at a foreign seat (e.g. Singapore) issues an interim order, Indian courts are unlikely to enforce it directly: instead it would be part of the award or enforced in the foreign seat. Under the New York Convention and the Act, only final awards, or certain orders certified as awards, are enforceable in India, not interim orders per se. Thus, a SIAC security order from Singapore would either have to be made part of the final award or enforced in Singapore, and only the award enforced in India under Sections 48–49 of the Act.
A practical issue is that deposit-of-security orders may raise questions under Indian procedure and even constitution. For example, tribunals must observe natural justice when ordering deposits; Evergreen implied that fairness requires the tribunal to consider both sides’ arguments, it faulted the tribunal only for not distinguishing lockdown periods, not for ordering per se. If a tribunal acting under SIAC rules, even in India, failed to give a party hearing on the security application, an Indian court might set aside the order for breach of natural justice. On constitutional grounds, one could argue that depriving a party of funds, by mandating a deposit, should meet strict scrutiny, but no reported case has applied Articles 14 or 21 to an arbitration deposit. The policy of the Arbitration Act clearly favors giving effect to party agreements and arbitration rules, so such constitutional challenges would likely fail absent egregious circumstance.
From an enforcement standpoint, orders for security may pose logistical issues if a tribunal orders a deposit and the party fails to comply, tribunals often have power to proceed. But converting a draft order into actual cash can be tricky: Indian courts may require formal procedures for garnishment, attachment of bank accounts, or appointment of a receiver. Section 17 orders can be executed via the Code of Civil Procedure, yet in practice one may need to apply for execution or attachment. Failure to comply could be met by contempt or by treating non-payment as a breach warranting an adverse award.
Finally, enforcement under the Act ensures India is a secure seat for arbitration. Section 17(3) and the 2015 amendments emphasize enforcement: a Section 17 order is as good as a court injunction. This is crucial: without it, a domestic order to deposit security might be ignored. By deeming arbitrator’s orders enforceable, the Act aligns with SIAC’s approach that security orders must be meaningful. The only exception would be if a party applied for Court relief under Section 9, which is precluded once an arbitrator is active as per Section 9(3).
Conclusion
The SIAC Rules 2025 explicitly empower tribunals to order security deposits for both costsand claims. Singapore courts in DJK v DJN reaffirm that tribunals have “wide” discretion under these rules, and can require security whenever a party’s case appears weak and it is just to do so. OCBC provides an enduring precedent: if a defendant’s defence is “very small,” security for claim and costs should be imposed. In Singapore practice, these orders protect the successful party while preserving fairness.
In India, the Act’s Section 17 broadly allows a tribunal to compel security for any claim, just as Section 9 empowers courts to do so. Post-2015 amendments, tribunal orders are enforceable as civil orders. However, Indian law also imposes checks. Supreme Court authority such as Evergreen, insists that if liability is genuinely disputed, a Section 17 deposit order cannot be blanketly imposed. In practice, Indian tribunals will analogize Section 17 relief to CPC O.38 R.5: they grant security only where a strong case exists and there is risk of asset-stripping. Courts under Section 9 have similarly applied flexible principles, such as Essar House, but still may require evidence of potential award defeat.
For India-related arbitrations, these differences matter. An India-seated SIAC arbitration can validly apply Rules 48–49 by party agreement, but its tribunal must still heed Indian interim-relief norms. Enforcement of any deposit order will proceed under the Act and CPC as if a court order. Thus, a tribunal’s SIAC-style security order in an Indian arbitration will carry full domestic enforcement weight. If the seat is outside India, a SIAC deposit order would not be enforceable here unless embodied in an enforceable award. Any party seeking such security in India will likely still rely on Sections 17 or 9 of the Act and prevailing case law, which generally allow such orders subject to showing urgency and risk.
In conclusion, while SIAC’s security provisions are expansive and influential, their import in India is mediated by the Act. Indian tribunals and courts recognize the logic of requiring security to prevent injustice, but they insist on fair process and substantive justification. The tribunal’s power to order deposits is backed by enforceability, yet Indian precedents, e.g. Evergreen, impose prudential limits. When SIAC-derived orders intersect with Indian law, one must balance international practice with domestic safeguards: parties may enjoy the benefits of SIAC’s procedural toolkit, but subject to India’s rule of law requirements and intermediate review.
[i] [2024] SGHC 309
[ii] [2006] SGHC 147
[iii] 2016 SCC OnLine Del 5023
Author(s)
Abdul Haseeb
Student at RMLNLU, Lucknow
Rishabh Chauhan
Senior Associate at S&A Law offices